After years of eye-opening statistics about cybersecurity attacks, it is AI’s turn. As AI systems proliferate across industries and into everyday activities, the tracking and tallying of incidents shows that AI’s risks are growing more layered, global, urgent and numerous.
As of July 2025, the non-profit AI Incident Database (AIID) has tagged and categorized more than 1,140 publicly reported incidents across 23 types of AI harms (based on 4,724 reports). Since the start of May 2025, AIID has added 57 new incident IDs, AIID editor Daniel Atherton told the Cybersecurity Law Report. Additionally, the Organisation of Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD) has an automated tracker that has added an average of approximately 330 AI incident reports per month to its database in 2025 to date.
Nonpublic incidents are beginning to surface, too. In April 2025, the non-profit MITRE, which has long managed the U.S. government’s cybersecurity vulnerabilities database (CVEs), launched an incident‑sharing initiative to accept confidential reports of manipulations, tampering, model jacking and other malicious acts affecting AI systems. “We’re trying to be a third-party safe space,” said Christina Liaghati, department manager for Trustworthy and Secure AI at MITRE. “The data about incidents is very difficult to get outside of organizational silos” without an organization like MITRE trying to standardize and grow reporting, she told the Cybersecurity Law Report.
If AI is truly to be a solution for companies and the world, business leaders and corporate boards likely will need to hear more stories about AI’s problems. “The ability to manage potential incidents is essential,” said Douglas Robbins, vice president of MITRE Labs, in a statement. “Standardized and rapid information sharing about incidents will allow the entire community to improve the collective defense of such systems and mitigate external harms.”
This article shares observations by Atherton and Liaghati on the maturity of AI incident tracking, how to define what counts as an AI incident, trends in adverse events and benefits for companies that report their incidents.
See “First Independent Certification of Responsible AI Launches” (Apr. 12, 2023).
AIID Tracking and Trends
The AIID, run by the Responsible AI Collaborative and edited primarily by humans, has operated since 2018. The 1,140 (and counting) reports include 249 incidents that occurred before 2020.
What the AIID Tracks
AIID’s collection of incidents is based almost fully on published reports submitted by contributors, individuals and automated searches. The site is browsable, providing a discovery tool that filters and displays incident records in spatial, table and list views.
AIID classifies incidents by the domains of risk involved (e.g., discrimination and AI system safety), the AI use or goal, the sector(s) of deployment, and whether outcomes were expected or unexpected. More granularly, its descriptions of incidents refer to three taxonomies of detailed AI harms, which cumulatively sort AI failures into 65 subtypes.
AIID is a lagging indicator of emerging AI problems because it tends to compile only incidents exposed in news reports, and not direct reports from companies that experienced an incident, Atherton stressed. “Editorial bandwidth and resource constraints” limit its comprehensiveness, he cautioned, adding that “incident count is just a focused snapshot of the available reporting on an overwhelming reality that is not and cannot be fully reported through current means.”
In addition to incidents, AIID has begun including public reports of issues and vulnerabilities with AI use.
See “Dos and Don’ts for Employee Use of Generative AI” (Dec. 6, 2023).
Trends in Incidents
Three CEO Deepfakes Drew Alarm
Impersonations of corporate executives and other leaders using AI-generated video and voice have increased. In July 2025, the voice cloning of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio for diplomatic communications drew attention in C‑suites, joining the following three earlier incidents:
- Arup Group was scammed out of $25 million via a deepfake video call impersonating its chief financial officer (Incident 634).
- Ferrari faced a targeted attack using a voice clone of CEO Benedetto Vigna (Incident 966).
- WPP, the advertising giant, thwarted an attempt involving AI voice cloning and YouTube footage of its CEO (Incident 983).
“These three stories constantly get repeated” and invoked as warnings to businesses, Atherton said. The Arup case is cited frequently because the amount is quite astounding for a theft using a deepfake, he added.
Romance, Crypto and Celebrity Scams Dominate
Other scams using AI-generated clones prey on emotions and interest in fame and money. “We’re seeing a massive uptick in romance scams, celebrity impersonations and cryptocurrency fraud,” Atherton noted.
AI Slop Becomes an Ambient Threat
“AI slop” refers to the surge of low-quality, misleading or fake content that has become “part of the ambient reality that we live in,” Atherton explained. For example, after the Air India crash in 2025, AI-generated videos and images circulated widely, confusing the public and reportedly misleading investigators (Incident 1125).
The AI fakes “diverted resources, time and energy away from what actually occurred,” Atherton reported. AI slop creates moments of “epistemic ambiguity” that blur the line between real and fake, reducing trustworthiness, particularly in high-stakes environments, he elaborated.
Journalists rarely identify the AI tools used, which does not help combat scams and slop. It remains a big data point that is unanswered. “In many cases, as the editor, I simply have to say ‘unknown deepfake technology developer,’” Atherton lamented. Incident 1128 was a welcome change because journalists spotted Veo3, the video cloning tool, imprinted on the evidence, he enthused.
See our two-part series on phishing messages: “As Email Scams Surge, Training Lessons From 115 Million Phishing Messages” (Mar. 30, 2022), and “How to Measure Whether Your Company Is Ready to Catch Lots of Phish” (Apr. 6, 2022).
Unchecked Hallucinations in Law and Government
Results from AIID demonstrate that AI simulations are passing as authoritative proof. In Norway, a municipal report containing fake citations prompted the closure of schools and kindergartens (Incident 1009). “If someone creates a document that assumes nobody reads it carefully, the consequences can be very real,” Atherton warned. Judges are on the lookout, at least. In February 2025, a court fined the lawyers for MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell for submitting a filing with 30 large language model (LLM)-fabricated citations (Incident 1145).
Chatbot Sycophancy and Mental Health Risks
Another emerging concern is the psychological impact of LLMs on users. “By default, AI systems are becoming integrated into our everyday lives,” according to Atherton, a convergence shown by Incident 1106 in June 2025, which gathered reports of users becoming delusional after prolonged interactions with chatbots. These systems, designed to validate and reassure, can mirror users’ thoughts back to them in ways that reinforce unhealthy beliefs, which researchers call sycophancy, he noted.
See “Go Phish: Employee Training Key to Fighting Social Engineering Attacks” (Aug. 9, 2023).
More Consumer Complaints
AIID receives some reports about other companies’ incidents from individuals. In many of those cases, the person filing the report indicated to the Responsible AI Collaborative that they already had shared the same incident information with the relevant company, Atherton pointed out.
OECD’s Automated Incident Tracking
The OECD runs another, mostly automated, database called the AI Incident and Hazards Monitor (AIM). AIM has a collection of incidents similar to AIID. It has been adding an average of 337 incidents and hazards per month, captured by web scraping international news reports. Once it captures a list of incidents, LLMs evaluate their relevance and tag reports. AIM labels issues and vulnerabilities as “hazards.” While over 30 experts have helped set parameters for OECD’s classifications, a browse reveals that some of the automated reports on hazards miss the mark, describing AI use only, not misuse or risks.
AIID also uses automated crawling for incidents but finds false positives, Atherton said. As a researcher, his interest is the dynamics of public discussion of AI risks. However, facing the flood of AI fakery, he would not mind better automation. “I’m wading through the slop, in my wellies,” he added.
See our two-part series on a fake Zoom invite hack: “What Happened and Three Lessons” (Feb. 10, 2021), and “Eight More Lessons” (Feb. 17, 2021).
MITRE’s Approach to Information Sharing
As a leading cybersecurity research organization, MITRE has historically emphasized AI security, but now is broadening its “AI assurance” efforts. In April 2025, MITRE launched its AI Incident Sharing program to collect and analyze accidents and incidents.
An Initial Guide to AI Risks
In 2019, years before launching its AI Incident Sharing program, MITRE created the ATLAS matrix of adversary tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), which was modeled after MITRE’s ATT&CK framework used in cybersecurity. “We were starting to see these common patterns of incidents popping up,” Liaghati explained, “so we worked together with industry partners to start to characterize that into a standard.”
Each TTP in ATLAS is based on real-world case studies submitted by MITRE partner organizations and linked to an ATT&CK counterpart. “We don’t go out and scrape other resources,” Liaghati said.
Incident Sharing Launched
MITRE prepared for its AI incident information sharing initiative by holding sessions under Chatham House Rules, with as many as 50 organizations present at each, Liaghati explained. Given how fast attacks can pivot, “we want them to proactively share information with us as soon as they can,” she recalled.
Since starting the AI Incident Sharing program, MITRE has been receiving “weekly reports,” Liaghati said.
MITRE also encourages updates to reports, if possible. Companies may recognize, upon review of the incident’s forensics, that the failure that had some other root cause, Liaghati noted.
Only Participants Receive Full Reports
Unlike cybersecurity, where regulatory requirements often drive reporting, AI incident sharing remains voluntary. “It’s very much still a carrot approach,” Liaghati observed.
Only those organizations submitting to MITRE may receive access to shared indicators and the latest information. “If you want to be part of this trusted community group so you can improve your own security posture with data-driven risk intelligence, you have to submit” either incidents or demonstrated vulnerabilities, Liaghati explained. Submissions must reflect results from a “real-world deployed system or deployable system, or an actual attack on an operational system,” she clarified.
MITRE’s role as an honest broker is central to its approach. “There aren’t that many entities who can take an objective position,” Ozgur Eris, director of MITRE’s AI Innovation Center, told the Cybersecurity Law Report. “We’re aggregating information, making sense of it, and then sharing it with the people who can act on it,” offering an attractive benefit for participants, he explained.
For the broader public, MITRE has posted 32 case studies about AI incidents, Liaghati shared.
See “Can the Cybersecurity Industry Improve Cooperation to Beat Threats?” (Jan. 13, 2021).
Will Top AI Companies Participate?
The strength of MITRE’s initiative depends on the biggest AI developers participating. MITRE is engaging with them. For example, Liaghati shared, while MITRE is not directly part of the Frontier Model Forum, launched by major AI developers with its own information sharing effort, “there’s a lot of overlap in the groups involved.”
MITRE has encouraged the LLM giants to share information with its new network, particularly when they do not have mitigations for active risks. Even if an LLM company opts not to announce vulnerabilities publicly out of fear of “handing an instruction manual to an attacker,” at least, “in some cases, it is better to engage with a trusted, protected group.”
See “Welcome to the GPT Store – and Its Three Million Security Uncertainties” (Mar. 27, 2024).
Defining an Incident
One of the thorniest issues MITRE faces is defining what counts as an AI incident. “This is definitely something that a lot of the community is still struggling with,” Liaghati observed. While many incidents involve security, MITRE is gathering information involving broader AI concerns, such as performance failures, reputational risks and interoperability issues in agent-based systems.
“We’re trying to make the incident database flexible across the range of assurance risks,” Liaghati said. This includes concerns like “verifying interactions between systems, logging those interactions and ensuring human-in-the-loop oversight,” she elaborated.
MITRE welcomes reports of not just malicious attacks, but also red-teaming exercises and system failures. Companies are “getting better at defining incidents and at defining vulnerabilities,” and more “have deliberately gone deep on AI security,” Liaghati reported.
See our two-part series “What the AI Executive Order Means for Companies”: Seven Key Takeaways (Nov. 8, 2023), and Examining Red‑Teaming Requirements (Nov. 15, 2023).
Private Sector Drives Reporting
Most of the incident reports MITRE receives come from the private sector. “Industry has leaned in really quickly in deploying LLMs – and sometimes in really naive ways,” Liaghati observed.
“There’s understandably a lot more risk aversion and balanced approaches in government use cases,” Liaghati noted. MITRE is working closely with government sponsors to develop incident response frameworks, but practices remain very idiosyncratic, she said.
See “Prioritizing Public-Private Partnerships in an Increasingly Complex Regulatory Environment” (Mar. 2, 2022).
Tracking New Tactics
MITRE updates the ATLAS matrix of TTPs twice a year. Its Mid-2025 update added 19 tactics, many involving generative AI and supply chain vulnerabilities. New attack vectors have been detected during the time frame when an AI giant retrains its popular LLMs for updates, Liaghati said. “We’re continually seeing how [attackers] can take advantage of poisoning a dataset before somebody uses it,” she shared.
One case study, dubbed “ShadowRay,” offers “a really good example of supply chain attack vectors,” Liaghati continued. Attackers exploited software dependencies and a lack of authentication to steal an estimated $1 billion in computing power from companies’ AI systems.
See our two-part series on how to manage AI procurement: “Leadership and Preparation” (Sep. 18, 2024), and “Five Steps” (Oct. 2, 2024).
MITRE Shares Mitigations, Too
MITRE is trying to link all its tools. “Incidents are reactive datasets, whereas vulnerabilities are very proactive,” Liaghati noted. MITRE is updating its AI risk database in July 2025 and refining the Atlas case studies.
Most practically, MITRE publishes a roster of preventive mitigations, which are security concepts and technologies, that companies should consider. “We’re not just waving the flag so everybody should freak out. No, instead, let’s capture these problems so we can understand them and then mitigate them wherever possible,” Liaghati emphasized.
See our two-part series on managing legal issues arising from use of ChatGPT and Generative AI: “E.U. and U.S. Privacy Law Considerations” (Mar. 15, 2023), and “Industry Considerations and Practical Compliance Measures” (Mar. 22, 2023).
The Path Ahead for AI Incident Tracking
While MITRE’s AI assurance work remains in an early stage, momentum is building. “We started ATLAS with about 12 industry partners,” Liaghati said. “We now have over 150 organizations involved.”
The goal is to build a shared understanding of AI risks and a collective defense against them. “We’re trying to get the standardized information out there so people can better assure and secure their systems,” Liaghati emphasized.
The details in the MITRE and AIID databases are primarily handy for companies’ technical and AI development teams, but those teams will need to educate AI governance teams and, eventually, top executives about the broad types of incidents and accidents that have occurred and been documented.
For now, MITRE’s case studies provide educational material for companies’ AI teams. On the AIID website, Atherton’s team posts a bimonthly summary of incident trends.
Both MITRE and AIID are positioned to capture emerging AI trouble. As more companies participate in MITRE’s group, it likely will gain insights into the dark side of the rollout of agentic systems. “In the AI security community, some have predicted that the rapid increase of agentic systems may strengthen security because the agentic systems can monitor each other,” Liaghati noted. Others are skeptical because of the market’s eagerness to add a barely tested technology.
MITRE will proceed methodically, Liaghati said. Agentic AI risks are new and “not as demonstrated as they need to be to [be] include[d] in the ATLAS matrix yet,” she noted. However, it is a safe bet that anyone wanting to know about AI agent troubles will, before long, find some details in MITRE’s case studies and in AIID’s incident reports.
